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TORT NOTICE OF CLAIM TO MUNICIPALITIES
Act of 1937, P. L. 2547
HENRY S. SAHM*
INTRODUCTION

A subject of utmost practical importance in the administration of municipal
tort liability is the -interpretative connotation of statutes making mandatory the
filing of a notice of tort claims prior to instituting suit. Many legislative enactments contain provisions of this category and the judicial interpretation of these
requirements is being synthesized into a veritable jurisprudence of consequence to
both the public officials charged with this administration and the individual litigants
affected thereby. These statutes are generally similar in the various jurisdictions in
the information which is required to be given the political subdivision and the
period within which notice must b'e given.
Thirty states by statute require that notice of tort claims against municipalities1 be given within certain fixed time limits to designated city officers.2
*B.S., Lehigh University, 1931; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1936; member
of Lackawanna County Bar; Assistant City Solicitor of Scranton, Pa.
1The use of the terms "municipalities" and "cities" includes counties, boroughs, towns, townships, and school districts unless otherwise specified.
zAlabama, CODE, 1938, s. 1907; California, GENERAL LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, 1937, Act
5149; Colorado, COLORADO STATUTES, 1918, Title 10, s. 1414; Georgia, CODE, 1933, s.
69-308; Illinois, ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, 1937, c. 70, s. 7; Indiana, BALDWIN'S INDIANA STATUTE SERVICE, May 1935, s. 12515-1; Iowa, CODE OF IOWA, 1935, s. 6734;
Kansas, CORRICKS' GENERAL STATUTES KANSAS, ANNOTATED, 1935, S. 12-105; Maine,
REV. STATS., 1930, c. 27, s. 94, p. 530; Massachusetts, GEN. LAWS MASS., 1932, c. 84, s. 15
et seq; Michigan, MICH. STATS., ANNOTATED, 1936, s. 9598; Minnesota, MASON'S MINN.
STATS., 1927, c. 9, ss, 1831-33; Missouri, MO. STATS. ANNO., c. 38, s. 6454, p. 5459; Montana
REV. CODE OF MONT., 1935, c. 385, s. 5080; Nebraska, COMP. STATS., NEBR., s. 14-801;
New Hampshire, PUB. LAWS, N. H., 1926, c. 89, ss. 9 et seq., p; 341; New York, CAHILL'S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N. Y. (1930), c. 27, s. 74, Towns; c. 11, s. 6, County; c. 54, s. 244,
as amended-Laws, 1939, c. 724; North Dakota, N. D. COMP. LAWS, 1913, s. 3627; Oklahoma,
OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNO., c. 16, Tit. 11, s. 674; Pennsylvania, PURDONS PA. ST. ANN.,
tit. 53, S. 2774; Rhode Island, GEN. LAWS R. I., 1938, c. 352; South Dakota, S. D. COMP.
LAWS, 1929, s. 6339; Tennessee, TENN. CODE 1938, s. 8596; Utah, REV. STATS. UTAH, 1933,
s. 15-7-78; Vermont, PUB. LAWS VT. 1933, s. 4958; Virginia, VA. CODE, 1936, s. 6043A;
Washington, PIERCE'S CODE, 1933, ss. 703-4; Wisconsin, WIS. STATS., 1937, s. 81.15;
Wyoming, WYO. REV. STATS., 1931, 22-873.
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PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE STATUTE

The Pennsylvania Act of 1937, P. L. 2547, 53 P. S. 2774, reads as follows:
"that hereafter any person, copartnership, association or corporation
claiming damages from any county, city, borough, town, township,
school district or other municipality, arising from the negligence of
such municipality or any employe thereof, shall, within six (6)
months from the date of origin of such claim or within six (6)
months from the date of the negligence complained of, file in the
office of the clerk or secretary of such municipality a notice in writing
of such claim, stating briefly the facts upon which the claim is based.
Such notice shall be signed by the person or persons claiming damages or their representatives. No cause of action may be validly entered of record where there was a failure to file such notice within
the time required by this act, except leave of court to enter such action
upon a showing of a reasonable excuse for such failure to file said
notice shall first have been secured. ' '
The policy behind the enactment of the statute is to provide municipalities
with a safeguard against the loss of an opportunity to make timely investigation
and thus avoid the difficulty of defending against stale and fraudulent claims..'
The mischief to be remedied was that of having long accrued claims brought
against the city a considerable time after there was any chance for the city to secure
witnesses, and the object to be attained was the giving of notice to the municipality
in time to prepare a defense.5
The subject of the legislation is not a new one. It is recognized that the
municipalities referred to in the act are those created by the state, and in numerous
states, legislation regarding this subject has been enacted for the evident purpose
of giving the municipality an opportunity to investigate the case while conditions
are fresh, or making settlement of cases, and thus protecting itself against actions
which may be brought long after the occurrences!6
The notice places in the hands of the municipal authorities sufficient information whereby they may visit the scene of the accident, ascertain whether any mishap
might have occurred by reason of the alleged defect, and in general to determine
whether any just claim exists. A full investigation, made possible by the information disclosed in the notice, should place the proper authorities in a position to determine whether the claimant has a proper and just complaint, and whether settlement should be made. If the authorities reach the conclusion that no just cause
exists, or that the claimant is demanding too much for his injuries, the information
8As
to the act's constitutionality, see Barnett v. Borough of Aliquippa, 37 D. & C. 521.
4
Lutz v. Scranton, 140 Pa. Super. 139.
5
0'Hara v. Scranton, 35 D. & C. 42; Wilson v. Chester, 37 D. & C. 37; Bubb v. Sunbury,

37 D. & C. 399.

Johnson v. Canonsburg, 34 D. & C. 123.
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obtained will allow the City Solicitor's office to properly prepare for trial and
defense.
Another possible objective is to further the policy of avoiding needless litigation by affording the city a chance to settle out of court. It is true that a city,
unlike an individual, is often unaware of tortious action on its part. The main
object of the notice is that the municipality may have an early opportunity of investigating the cause of an injury and the condition of the person injured before
changes may occur essentially affecting such proof of the facts as may be desirable
for the city to possess. This, it seems, is the fundamental idea behind such type
of statutes.
GIVING OF NOTICE

Particular attention is called to Section 1 of the Act of 1937, supra, which
provides in mandatory language that anyone claiming damages from a political
subdivision:
"Shall ***** file *** a notice in writing *****"
The same section further states in mandatory language that:
"No cause of action may be validly entered of record where there
was a failure to file such notice within the time required by this
act*****.
In construing this section, the Superior Court in Lutz v. Scranton' seemed to
disregard this provision and the wording of the act when it stated:
"This Act does not expressly create a condition precedent. It contains
no words indicating an intent to create a condition precedent, nor
does it contain any words indicating any intent to impair the right
of action."
The court in the case of Johnson v. Canonsburg Borough,8 however, speaks

of this notice as a condition precedent. The court cites with approval McQuillan
on Municipal Corporations,9 stating:

"With reference to the notice, it appears to have been generally held
that the giving of notice is a condition precedent to a cause of action."
The same court states also: 10
"As a condition precedent to plaintiff's right to enter suit on her
claim for damages, she must give the notice required to the designated officers."
Again in the case of Barnett v. Aliquippa,11 the court apparently assumes that
such notice is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action. The court
7140 Pa. Super. 139, 143.
834 D. & C. 123, 126.
9(2d Ed.), Section 2888.
1034 D. & C. 123, 130.
1137 D. & C. 521, 527, 528.
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speaks of the act's provisions as "requiring precedent notice" and also states that
"without compliance with the condition precedent required, defendant borough
can never be held to answer the action of plaintiff."
A reading of the act discloses that a distinction is made between the "notice"
and a "cause of action." The act provides that "no cause of action may be validly
entered of record where there was a failure to file such notice *****" It would
seem, therefore, that the act requires a notice to be filed in addition to the statement of claim since the wording of the act distinguishes between the "notice" and
the "cause of action."
However, in Lutz v. Scranton12 the Superior Court held that if a statement of
claim is filed within the requisite period of time (six months from the date of the
accident) that there has been compliance with the act and that no notice is necessary. This would seem to disregard the distinction between the "cause of action"
and the "notice." If effect is to be given to the notice as a condition precedent, it
would seem that such prerequisite should be averred in the statement of claim. To
hold that the statement of claim could be substituted in lieu of the notice (providing it is filed within six months) means that no effect is given to the notice as a
condition precedent since it would be impossible to aver in the statement of claim
that such notice, had been given. This results in creating an anomalous situation
which in effect disregards the express mandate of the act and renders ineffective
the distinction between the "notice" and "cause of action."
To give effect to the express wording of the act, and to the condition precedent would require the statement of claim to allege the giving of notice to the City
Clerk and unless the actual giving of notice were proved, the plaintiff would not
have stated or shown a cause of action. As an obvious consequence, it would follow that the defendant could properly object to the failure of the plaintiff to allege
compliance with the statutory condition precedent.
Since this act'" states in explicit and unequivocal language that this notice
must be given to the political subdivision, it should follow as a necessary corollary
that it is a condition precedent. 4 Since it is a condition precedent to instituting
suit, the logical conclusion would seem to be that this prerequisite must be given
effect by holding that compliance with the act must be alleged in the plaintiff's
statement of claim.
The Superior Court in Lutz v. Scranton' 5 came to the opposite conclusion. In
discussing the necessity of averring in the statement of claim that notice was given
the court stated:
"Inorder to justify binding instructions or the entering of judgment
n. o. v. this act would have to be construed to require the plaintiff in
12140 Pa. Super. 139, 142.
13Act of 1937, P. L. 2547, 53 P. S. 2774.
14See
notes 9, 10 and 11, supra.
5
1 Note 4, supra.
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this case to aver and prove not only that notice was given within six
months of the accident but to aver and prove that notice was given
prior to suit."
The court then decided that such notice was unnecessary where the statement of
claim was filed within six months of the accident.
It would seem that with the policy and purpose of the statute in mind, the
result reached by the Superior Court is not satisfactory. The object of the statute
is to secure information to the proper officials, so that they may determine the
genuineness of the claim and decide upon a course of action by either settling the
claim out of court, or, if necessary, prepare to defend in court prior to the time of
16
institution of action litigation.
In a case decided in Indiana, 17 a statute similar to the Pennsylvania Act provided:
"No action for damages for injuries to the person, resulting from
any defect in the condition of any street, shall be maintained against
a City unless written notice, containing a brief description of the
** *** cause of such injury, shall be given within 60 days thereafter."
The court in holding this requirement to be a condition precedent said:
"In the first place, it has been settled by the courts of this state, that
the provisions of the statute are mandatory, and the giving of the
notice is a condition precedent to the right to maintain the action;
that facts showing the giving of the notice must be alleged in the
complaint or it will be held insufficient upon demurrer."
The Supreme Court of Tennessee' 8 stated:
"The language of the statute is: 'No suit shall be brought ......
unless within 90 days .....
.a written notice shall be served upon
the mayor.' This clearly implies that the notice must be given before
filing suit and as a condition precedent to the right to begin the suit.
It is expressly provided by the statute that 'no suit shall be brought',
unless the notice is given. The effect of this language is to make the
giving of notice a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to sue,
and, the giving of notice being a condition precedent to the plaintiff's
right to sue, a compliance with the statute must be averred in the
declaration or complaint. In upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, Knoxville v. Felding, 153 Tenn. 586, 285 S. W. 47, the court
treated the statute as imposing a condition precedent upon the right
to sue a municipality for an injury sustained, and held that the statute
affects not merely the remedy but the cause of action itself. In the
6

l Note 6, supra.
17Indianapolis v. Uland, 10 N. E. (2d) 907 (1931).
The Indiana complaint substantially
contains
8 the same averments as required by the Pennsylvania Practice Act.
1 Gilkey v. City of Memphis, 17 S. W. (2d) 4 (1929).
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course of the opinion the court said: 'The act in mandatory language
prescribes a formal notice of the time, place, and nature of the injury
as a condition precedent to the right to sue, and recover, and unless
these requirements are met the city is not liable.' The necessary result of this construction of the statute is that the prescribed written
notice must have been served upon the mayor of the city before the
suit was instituted. Until the statute was complied with, there was
no liability on the part of the city and no cause of action had accrued
to the plaintiffs. Notice given after the issuance of summons, is not
a compliance with the statute." (Italics supplied.)
Tht courts of Pennsylvania have consistently held that if the performance of
some condition precedent on the plaintiff's part is essential to a good cause of
action, its performance must be fully averred. 19 Thus, if a demand upon the defendant is a necessary condition precedent to the existence of the plaintiff's cause
of action, the plaintiff must in his statement of claim, aver the making of such
demand.2 0
There is, however, a vital distinction between the cases where the claim was
originally enforceable by suit and those where the claim is not enforceable unless
the statutory requirements have been observed. In the latter case the statement
must either show that the case is within the statute or set forth the facts necessary
21
to take the case out of the statute.
Where compliance with the limitation period is an integral part of the cause
of the statement of claim to show compliof action it is necessary to the sufficiency
22
ance with the statutory requirement.
These dictates laid down by the various Pennsylvania courts should likewise
be applicable to the provisions of the Act of 1937 requiring notice of tort claims
to municipalities. 2 3 This would result in requiring litigants to file written notice
with the municipality prior to instituting suit regardless of whether a statement of
claim were filed within six months of the accident.
DEFECTIVE NOTICE

The question may arise as to what stage of a proceeding would be the propej
time to assert deficiencies in the notice itself.
Section 1 of the act 24 reads:

"No cause of action may be validly entered of record where therc
19Scott v. Patterson, 13 County Ct. 614; Rice v. Schuylkill County, 14 County Ct. 541; Record
Pub. 2Ct. v. Forwood, 7 Del. Ct. Rep. 564.
u 0Dewart v. Masser, 40 Pa. 302. See also Gould
v. Gage, 118 Pa. 559, 12 At. 476.
21First Pool Gas Coal Co. v. Wheeler Run Coal Co., 301 Pa. 485, 152 At. 685; Mason-Heflin
Coal 2Co. v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 AtI. 202; Hogle v. DeLong, 248 Pa. 471, 94 At. 190.
ZSee 17 R. C. L. p. 985, Sec. 363. See also Crawford v. Schaeffer, 8 Dist. Rep. 32.
2
3See note 13, supra.
24Ibid.
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was a failure to file such notice within the time required by this
act **** "
The wording of the act would seem to indicate that unless this notice were
first served upon the proper authorities that the court would have no jurisdiction.
Since this is so and since the general rule is that want of jurisdiction may be taken
advantage of at any stage of the cause, 28 it should follow that this question can be
26
raised at any part of the proceedings.
GIVING OF NOTICE
27

Section 1 of the act provides that litigants must:
"file in the office of the Clerk or Secretary of such municipality a
notice in writing of such claim, ****".
The wording of the act in this regard is clear, explicit and unambiguous. The
notice must be given by the person indicated by the act, and must be served on the
official therein indicated, and service on other persons or notice to them is not the
28
equivalent of the notice required by the statute.
In one case 29 the plaintiff alleged that he made an oral complaint to the desk
sergeant at the police station, which the sergeant wrote down in a complaint book
and that he also wrote a letter about the injury to the City Clerk and mailed it. No
proof of its receipt was offered and the City Clerk testified that his records did not
disclose receipt of such notice. The court in holding such notice to be defective
stated:
"While it seems immaterial whether the notice required by this
statute to be filed in the office of the Clerk is delivered personally or
by mail, so long as it is actually received and filed, it would virtually
defeat the purpose of the statute if we were to indulge the presumption of receipt from proof of mailing that arises in ordinary business
transactions. The clash of oral testimonies would be substituted for
the certain proof of the paper in the files. Evidence would be entirely in the hands of claimants, and confusion and controversies
would result. The words of the statute must be given their effective
and clear meaning." (Italics supplied.)
However, in another case,3 0 where the plaintiff, upon receiving an injury,
orally reported it to a city policeman and also to the chairman of the city department of streets and to the Mayor and thereafter negotiated with the city officials
25

Pennsylvania R. R. v. Bogert, 209 Pa. 589, 59 At .100; Smith v. McClure, 257 Pa. 168, 101
Ad. 347; Caruso v. Gallo, 62 Pa. Super. 584.
26Ct. Grimes v. Scranton (unreported) 1711 Sept. Term 1939 (Lackawanna County) holding
that defects
in the notice must be taken advantage of some time prior to trial.
27
Note 13, supra.
8
2 Johnson v. Canonsburg Borough, 34 D. & C. 123, 126. Accord, Brahm v. City of Uniontown,2 937 Fayette Law Journal 222.
Brahm v. City of Uniontown, 37 Fayette Law Journal 222.
80Bubb v. City of Sunbury, 37 D. & C. 399.

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

for the settlement of his claim and submitted to a physical examination by the citf's
physician, the court held that the city was estopped from setting up the act as a
defense even though no written notice of the litigant's claim was filed within six
months. The court said:
"We are of the opinion that by reason of the City of Sunbury having
entered into negotiations for the settlement of the claim of petitioner
within the six months period and, having taken official action by the
employment of a physician for the examination of petitioner within
the period of six months, the examination having been made within
said period, and having been made with the object of a settlement,
and the long-delayed report of the city physician relative to the examination constitute a reasonable excuse for failure to file the notice
in writing required, and is ample and sufficient reason for the court,
in the exercise of its discretion, to grant leave to petitioner to enter
his action.
"We are likewise of the opinion in view of the City of Sunbury
having been fully informed of all facts in connection with the accident immediately thereafter, and having made its investigation with
relation thereto within the six months' period provided by the act, it
cannot in any way be prejudiced by the institution of a new suit by
petitioner; that the City of Sunbury, by reason of having taken official
action with relation to the accident, has waived the provisions of the
Act of 1937, and is 'estopped from setting up said act as a defense.
To hold otherwise would, in our opinion, work a miscarriage of
justice."
In a recent case8" where the notice was served on the City Solicitor instead of
the City Clerk, the court held that since there was substantial compliance with the
act that the notice so given was valid. The court stated:
"Although the Act of Assembly in this case was not strictly complied
with, in that notice was served on the City Solicitor and not on the
City Clerk, however, an officer of the City of Scranton investigal:ed
the matter, and there is no allegation that the City is prejudiced in
its defense of this case by reason of the fact of the failure to serve the
notice in strict compliance with the Act of Assembly * * * * *"
However, another court had the following observation to make:
"The fact that the plaintiff talked with the borough police officers
and with a Councilman, whom she informed of the accident, and :he
manner in which she claimed it occurred, does not appear to us to be
material. The Act provides that the notice shall be filed in the office
8

lNote 26, supra. See Diem v. Goldman, 40 D. & C. 448, where it was held that "notice
served *** upon the Mayor is not a sufficient compliance with the Act."
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of the Clerk or Secretary of the Municipality, and that it shall be in
writing. This was a legislative provision, and it is not the duty or
within the powers of the Courts to legislate by construction where
the language of the Act is clear and specific. As a condition precedent to plaintiff's right to enter suit on her claim for damages, she
** "32
must give the notice required to the designated officer*

(Italics supplied.)
The better view would appear to be that since the municipal corporation is a
creature of the legislature, existing only by virtue of its will, an enactment made
by the legislature must be complied with, and cannot be waived.33 Judicial leniency might result in confusion, strained factual distinctions and lack of uniform
interpretation.
CONCLUSION

Judge Gibson in a recent case 34 sharply defines the fundamental purpose of
this statute which requires notice to the political subdivision as a condition precedent to filing suit to enforce any tort liability. This decision points out that the
statute is designed to give to the municipality notice of the facts of the accident in
order that it may be informed so as to be able to undertake a timely investigation,
locate witnesses, etc. It is not the purpose of this legislation to require notice of
the theory on which the cause of action is based. While the notice operates as a
condition precedent to the maintenance of the suit, it is to be distinguished from
the kind of notice that is afforded by the pleadings in the action itself.1 5
The practical effect of this enactment is of course to afford a peculiar type of
short statute of limitations which may serve as a bar to claims against cities for
injuries. The notice required by this statute is to be clearly distinguished from
notice of defects which must always be proved, actually or constructively, in order
to sustain municipal liability for injury resulting from defective conditions of
streets, sidewalks, and kindred causes. An example of the confusion resulting from
a failure so to distinguish is found in the case of Grimes v. Scranton.3 6 In this case
the court held that a city had notice sufficient to satisfy the notice of claim statute
where the condition complained of was investigated by the city's agent.
32

Note 6, supra.
334 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, (5th Ed.) Sec. 1613: "As the municipality itself was
created by charter or by statute, and has no powers other than those conferred upon it by its charter
or by statute, it cannot waive the giving of the statutory notice, although in some jurisdictions, it
is held that, by accepting and acting on a defective notice, the right to object, to the sufficiency is
waived."
34
Johnson v. Canonsburg, 34 D. & C. 123.
35CI.
Lutz v. Scranton, 140 Pa. Super. 139.
36
Note 26, supra. See also Bubb v. Sunbury, 37 D. &.C. 399, where the court held that the
entering into negotiations of settlement by the city with the plaintiff inter alia was substantial com-

pliance with the act even though no formal written notice was ever served on the proper municipal
authorities.
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The extent and burden of this class of litigation upon municipalities and their
taxpayers has long been a subject of consideration by legislatures and courts
throughout the country.8 7 It should be, and so far as a study cf the cases reveal,
has been, the aim of both to provide sufficient opportunity for the enforcement of
just claims, and still to prevent imposition. Acting upon this concept, the legislature has seen fit to place in front of actions and claims of this type certain restrictions and bars for the protection of the municipality, and among them none has
been more important than the requirement for such prompt and detailed notice of
claim as would permit a full and efficient investigation of its merits.
It would seem to be the duty of the courts to render a literal and reasonable
construction of such statutes. They should not, by a strained technical interpretation, build up immaterial and unsubstantial variances or omissions into inequ.itable and unjust defenses against meritorious claims. But, upon the contrary, they
should not lightly and easily go to the other extreme of devising excuses for, and
ways of escape from failure to comply with explicit, reasonable, and important
provisions.
Whether or not the requirements of the act serve any good or useful purpose
is not within the sphere of the judicial ken. The filing of such notice within the
time specified is made a condition precedent to the right of recovery. Clearly the
legislature had the right to impose such a condition, and no reason is apparent why
a forced or strained construction should be placed upon the language of the statute
for the purpose of relieving a litigant from the necessity of complying with its
plain and explicit terms.
That which the legislature has declared, by statute, to be a prerequisite to the
commencement of an action, the court should not say is unimportant and may be
disregarded.
The statute is explicit and unambiguous; it needs no interpretation and the
legislature having made its observance a condition precedent to the bringing of an
action, the court, it is submitted, should not feel at liberty to permit any substitute
for it. Pennsylvania tribunals take the view that a court should not add anything
to a statute or take anything from it where the language of the statute is clear. 38
To permit any departure from its plain terms is to introduce into it an element of
uncertainty, and to open the way for a complete breaking down and nullification
of the statute; and instead of having a uniform interpretation applicable to all
cases, there will be no settled rule. As a consequence, the courts will be called
upon, over and over again, to determine whether upon the facts in each particular
case the statute has been substantially complied with, or its spirit and purpose subserved, thus leading to endless confusion. The requirements of the statute are
87

See note 2, supra.
8SOrlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 Atd. 112; Reitz v. Sinking Fund Commission, 315 Pa. 87,
172 Atd. 292; Commonwealth v. Gouger, 21 Pa. Super. 217; Commonwealth v. West Philadelphia

Fidelis Mannechor, 115 Pa. Super. 241, 175 At. 434.
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simple, clear, explicit and easily complied with, and their literal enforcement would
prevent ultimate confusion and uncertainty.
There is today an overwhelming opinion in favor of the assumption of municipal liability.89 The modern trend is against the rule of municipal non-liability
for tort. If the doors of the courts are to be opened wider for suits against municipalities, it would mean that thtre would be a more pressing need in the future for
such a safe course as the notice requirement to prevent fraudulent claims against
political subdivisions.
SCRANTON, PA., AUGUST, 1941
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89
See, 2 Legal notes on Local Government, September 1936, p. 89-100, by Professor Edwin M.
Borchard.

